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Abstract
This is a chapter on quantum cryptography for the book “A Mul-
tidisciplinary Introduction to Information Security” to be pub-
lished by CRC Press in 2011/2012. The chapter aims to introduce
the topic to undergraduate-level and continuing-education students
specializing in information and communication technology.
5.1 Introduction
When information is transmitted in microscopic systems, such as single photons
(single light particles) or atoms, its information carriers obey quantum rather
than classical physics. This offers many new possibilities for information pro-
cessing, since it is possible to invent novel information processes prevented by
classical physics.
Quantum cryptography is the most mature technology in the new field of
quantum information processing. Unlike cryptographic techniques where the
security is based on unproven mathematical assumptions,1 the security of quan-
tum cryptography is based on the laws of physics. Today it is developed with
an eye towards a future in which cracking of classical public-key ciphers might
become practically feasible. For example, a quantum computer might one day
be able to crack today’s codes. The one-time pad2 remains unassailable even
1For instance, the security of RSA public-key cryptography (Chapter 3) rests on the widely-
believed assumption that the factorization problem is computationally hard. Although no
efficient factorization algorithm is publicly known, it has not been proven that one does
not exist. Shor’s algorithm for a quantum computer already allows efficient factorization,
however it remains an open question if and when a scalable quantum computer is built.
Furthermore, once a classical encryption is broken, the crack can be applied to today’s secrets
retroactively. This is uncomfortable for many types of secret information whose value persists
for decades: government and military communication, commercial secrets, as well as certain
personal information such as financial and medical records.
2It has been proven that a secure cipher needs to use the amount of secret key at least as
large as the length of the message [16]. The one-time pad (Section 3.2) is one such cipher.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
17
18
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  8
 A
ug
 20
11
by such future techniques. The weakness of the one-time pad is that a secret,
random, symmetric key as long as the message it is intended to encrypt must
be securely distributed to the message’s intended receiver. Furthermore, the
key can only be used once. Quantum cryptography solves this key distribution
problem in a way unfeasible using only classical physics, by exploiting how single
quantum particles behave.
The working principles of quantum cryptography can simply be explained
by considering information transmission using single photons. A single photon
can represent a quantum bit, a so-called qubit. To determine the qubit value one
must measure the representing property of the photon (for example polariza-
tion). According to quantum physics, such a measurement will inevitably alter
the same property. This is disastrous for anyone trying to eavesdrop on the
transmission, since the sender and receiver can easily detect the changes caused
by the measurement. Since the security can only be determined after a trans-
mission, this idea can not be used to send the secret message itself. However,
it can be used to transmit a secret, random, symmetric key for one-time-pad
cryptography. If the transmission is intercepted, the sender and receiver will
detect the eavesdropping attempt,3 the key can be discarded and the sender
can transmit another key until a secure key is received.
In spite of the simple principles behind quantum cryptography, the idea
was first conceived as late as 1970 in an unpublished manuscript written by
Stephen Wiesner. The subject received very little attention until its resurrection
by a classic paper published by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984.
Currently, the technology required for quantum cryptography is available for
real-world system implementations.
The objective of this chapter is to present the working principle of quantum
cryptography and to give examples of quantum cryptography protocols and
implementations using technology available today. Throughout the chapter we
minimize the use of quantum physics formalism and no previous knowledge of
quantum physics is required. References are provided for the interested reader
who craves for more details. A good starting point is the excellent review by
Gisin et al. [6]; also the original paper [1] explains the quantum cryptography
protocol very well.
5.2 Quantum Bit
All information can be reduced to elementary units, which we call bits. Each
bit is a yes or no that can be represented by the number 0 or the number
1. However, as we will see, reading and writing this information to a qubit is
something quite different from reading and writing this information to a classical
bit.
We can think of a (qu)bit as a box, where we can store one of the two bit
values by putting a ball with one out of two colors into the box as illustrated
in Figure 5.1. To read the bit value of the box, we simply open the box and
register the color of the ball inside. For the classical bit, the color of the ball
inside is always the same as the color of the ball stored in the box in the first
3No such possibility exists if the key is exchanged using classical physics because classical
bits can be read, and hence copied without the risk of destroying the original bit value.
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Figure 5.1: Classical versus quantum bit. (a) Classical bit: If we put the ball
in a classical box, the color of the ball that pops out is the same as the color
we put in. (b) Qubit: If we put the ball in a quantum box and open the wrong
door, the color of the ball that comes out is random.
place. However, this is not necessarily the case for qubits.4 In the quantum
formalism, the two different doors of the box represent two different ways of
measuring the qubit value. To read the correct bit information we need to know
which door was used when the qubit was stored, and use the same door. If we
open the wrong door, the ball inside will have a random color, and thus the
information stored in the qubit will change to a random bit value. This also
means that the stored information is destroyed.
One realization of the qubit is a polarized photon. One way of determining
the polarization of the photon is to send it through a polarizing beamsplit-
ter, and measure at which output of the polarizing beamsplitter the photon
is found.5 However, since the polarizing beamsplitter only separates between
orthogonal polarizations, we cannot orient the polarizing beamsplitter at two
angles at the same time. Thus, we can not read the qubit value unless we have
additional information. For example, if we know that the polarization is either
horizontal or vertical in a defined reference coordinate system6 we can read the
qubit value by orienting the beamsplitter to the axis of the coordinate system.
If we find a photon at one output of the beamsplitter we know that the photon
polarization was horizontal; if we find it at another output the polarization was
vertical (see Figure 5.2). That is, we need to know a priori which coordinate
system is used in preparing the qubit to read it correctly. If we use another
orientation of the beamsplitter, the result of the measurement will be random
just like when opening the wrong door of the quantum box in Figure 5.1. Note
that once the photon has been detected in one of the outputs after the beam-
splitter, the photon actually assumes the output polarization, with no trace of
its original polarization left – this is how the nature works at the quantum level.
4We have borrowed this way of visualizing a qubit from John Preskill [14].
5A polarizing beamsplitter is a device that separates orthogonal linear polarizations of
incoming light into two directions.
6In quantum physics the orientation of the beamsplitter is called the basis.
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Figure 5.2: Qubit as a polarized photon. (a) A photon source is followed by a
linear polarizer to generate a qubit with the desired polarization, in this case a
horizontally polarized photon. (b) When a horizontally polarized photon passes
through a horizontally-vertically oriented polarizing beamsplitter, it is always
found at the exit of the beamsplitter corresponding to the horizontal polariza-
tion. (c) When a horizontally polarized photon passes through a diagonally
oriented beamsplitter, the photon has 50% probability to be found at each exit
(but the photon will only be detected at one of the exits!). Furthermore, the
photon will have a corresponding diagonal polarization afterwards. Therefore,
the measurement has changed the state of the photon.
5.3 Quantum Copying
To copy a qubit we need to read the bit value, i.e., we need to open the quantum
box. However, there is no way of knowing which door was used to store the bit
value of the qubit. If we simply guess one of the doors we may damage the
information stored in qubit. Thus generally, since quantum bits cannot be
perfectly read, quantum bits can not be perfectly copied either.7
Usually, the ability to copy information is considered to be very useful. But,
in secure communication, this would be disastrous since the eavesdropper could
listen to the communication and keep a copy of the message. However, qubits
cannot be copied. This non-copying property of quantum information can be
exploited for secure communication. Therefore qubits can be used to distribute
a key from sender to recipient without the possibility for the eavesdropper to
obtain a copy surreptitiously.
5.4 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography is not used directly to transmit the secret information,
but is rather used to distribute a random secret key, see Figure 5.3. Once the
key has successfully been transmitted, it can be used in a classical symmetric
cipher (such as the one-time pad described in Section 3.2 or AES described in
Section 2.2.2) to encrypt and decrypt information. Let’s consider the quantum
key distribution protocol.
5.4.1 The BB84 Protocol
To explain the protocol, let us call the sender Alice, and the receiver Bob.
Assume that Alice generates a random sequence of bits, codes them in qubits
randomly using door X or door Z of the quantum box, and sends the qubits
over a quantum channel to Bob. Bob does not know which doors Alice used,
7For a strict quantum-mechanical proof of this fact, see [23]. The proof is very short.
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Random secret key
Quantum key distribution channel
Figure 5.3: Using quantum key distribution in a symmetric encryption scheme.
The first step is distribution of a secret key between Alice and Bob. Then,
the key can be used by a symmetric cipher to encode and decode transmitted
information.
and therefore he randomly picks doors. The result is that Bob opens the right
door only half the time. In those cases he reads the right information. Bob’s
bits are called the raw key at this stage. After Bob has opened all the quantum
boxes, both he and Alice publicly announce which doors were used to store and
measure the qubits values. They then keep only the qubit values from the boxes
where they happened to use the same doors. This random sequence of bits now
shared by Alice and Bob is called the sifted key, and is about half as long as the
original raw key.
What happens if the eavesdropper Eve tries to open some of the quantum
boxes during the transmission? If Eve by chance opens the right door she can
copy the information and send it to Bob. However, half of the time she will
open the wrong door and might change the value of the qubit. If Alice and
Bob conduct a test and compare a small portion of their key, they can make
sure that Bob received what Alice sent. If Alice’s and Bob’s portion of the key
matches, they can be confident that Eve did not open any boxes. On the other
hand if their keys do not agree, they know that Eve tried to measure the key.
What we have just described is the quantum key distribution protocol BB84,
first presented in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard. Given that Alice and Bob can
only measure the fraction of errors in the key, often called the quantum bit error
rate, the protocol either provides a provably secure key or informs Alice and
Bob that the key distribution failed.
5.4.2 The BB84 Protocol Using Polarized Light
The BB84 protocol can be implemented using polarized single photons as il-
lustrated in Figure 5.4. Alice codes the qubit using horizontal (bit value 0)
and vertical (bit value 1) polarization, or she codes the qubit using −45◦ (bit
value 0) or +45◦ (bit value 1) polarization.8 To receive the qubits Bob uses two
interchangeable polarizing beamsplitters and two photon detectors9 after the
beamsplitter. One polarizing beamsplitter allows Bob to distinguish between
the horizontal and vertical polarizations and the other polarizing beamsplitter
allows Bob to distinguish between the −45◦ and +45◦ polarizations. If Bob
8These two ways of doing the coding represent the two doors of the quantum boxes de-
scribed earlier.
9A photon detector is a device that gives a signal (‘click’) when a photon arrives at the
device.
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Sifted key – – 1 0 0 – 1 0 0 – 1 – 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
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Figure 5.4: BB84 protocol using polarized light (reprinted from [20]).
uses a polarizing beamsplitter compatible with the polarization choice of Alice
he will read the state of polarization correctly, i.e., he opened the right door. If
Bob uses a polarizing beamsplitter incompatible with the polarization choice of
Alice he will not be able to get any information about the state of polarization,
i.e., he opened the wrong door.
After receiving enough photons, constituting the raw key, Bob announces
over a public classical communication channel (e.g., over an internet connection)
the sequence of polarizing beamsplitters he used, but importantly not the result
of the measurement. Alice compares this sequence to the sequence of bases
(polarization choice) she used and tells Bob on which occasions he used the
right beamsplitter,10 but importantly not the polarization she sent. For these
bits, constituting the sifted key, Alice and Bob know that they have the same
bit values provided that an eavesdropper did not perturb the transmission.
To assess the security of the transmission, Alice and Bob select a random
subset of the sifted key and compare it over the public channel. If the trans-
mission were intercepted or perturbed, the correlation between their bit values
will be reduced, thus increasing the quantum bit error rate. All eavesdropping
strategies perturb the system in some way. Therefore, if Alice and Bob do not
measure any discrepancy in the subset of the key, they can be confident that
the transmission was not intercepted and they can use the remaining part of
the key for encryption.
5.5 Practical Quantum Cryptography
Any implementation of quantum key distribution uses technology available to-
day, meaning that the system components such as photon sources, transmission
channel, polarizing beamsplitters, and photon detectors, are imperfect. This
fact has several important implications.
10Effectively publicly announcing which door of the box was used to store each qubit.
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One imperfection common to all components is that photons sometimes get
lost. In a practical system, the majority of the photons exiting Alice will get
absorbed in the transmission channel, and those that reach the detector will
often fail to cause a click. In practice only the photons that have registered as
clicks in Bob’s detectors contribute bits to the raw key.
Another implication of imperfections is that the qubits are prepared and
detected not exactly in the basis as described by theory. Technological imper-
fections will lead to errors in the sifted key, errors that can not be distinguished
from errors resulting from any eavesdropping attempts. Realistic error rates
with today’s technology are in the order of a few percent. This quantum bit er-
ror rate is often dominated by false detection signals from the photon detectors,
so-called dark counts.11
5.5.1 Error Correction and Privacy Amplification
Alice and Bob can not be sure whether the errors in the sifted key resulted from
device imperfections or from eavesdropping. They have to assume the worst
and assume all errors were due to eavesdropping. At this point in the protocol,
Alice and Bob share classical information with high but not 100% correlation,
and assume that the third party Eve has partial knowledge of this information.
This problem can be solved by classical information theory, which has methods
of distilling a shorter, error-free key of which Eve has no knowledge about.
First, Alice and Bob need to apply classical error correction techniques to ob-
tain identical keys.12 Eve still knows some information about this key (actually
she knows even more than before, because Alice and Bob have had to reveal
more information while communicating publicly during the error correction).
The last step in the quantum cryptography protocol therefore is a privacy am-
plification procedure that shrinks the key and reduces the amount of information
Eve may know about it. Alice and Bob do privacy amplification by applying a
randomly chosen hash function of universal2-class to the error-corrected key.
13
As long as Bob has more information about Alice’s sifted key than Eve, privacy
amplification will produce a shorter final key about which Eve’s information is
arbitrarily small. To give a feel for the numbers, with realistic quantum bit
error rate of 4%, assumed to be dominated by eavesdropping, 2000 bit can be
distilled down to 754 secret bit about which Eve’s information is negligible (less
than 10−6 bit). With quantum bit error rate of 8% we can distill 105 secret bit
from the original 2000 bit [1].
The resulting workflow of a general quantum key distribution algorithm is
illustrated in Figure 5.5.
11Dark counts are clicks in detector without any photons present, and can thus be observed
at the detector output in the dark.
12Very high raw error rate of a few percent, while typical for quantum cryptography, usually
does not occur in classical telecommunication. Therefore, special error correction algorithms
have been developed for quantum cryptography.
13These hash functions and this application are different from those described in Chapter 4.
While the security of cryptographic hash functions in Chapter 4 in not proven, here the
security of the privacy amplification procedure [2] is unconditional, i.e., strictly proven against
an adversary who possesses unlimited computing power.
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Figure 5.5: Classical post-processing in quantum key distribution. Alice and
Bob start with the raw photon detection data, communicate over an authen-
ticated classical channel while performing sifting, error correction and privacy
amplification procedures, and arrive at a secret shared key about which Eve has
negligible information.
5.5.2 Security Proofs
The intuition as to why quantum key distribution provides perfectly secret key is
quite straightforward. However, the details of the proofs are very involved [15].
If one assumes that Eve can only interact with one qubit at a time,14 and that
Alice and Bob are using a perfect implementation of the protocol, it has been
proven that Eve will never know as much as Bob provided that the quantum bit
error rate is less than 14.65%. If Eve has unlimited power and can coherently
attack an unlimited number of qubits,15 i.e., she can do everything allowed by
the known laws of physics, it has been proven that a quantum bit error rate
less than 11% is required for secure communication. As long as the error rate is
below this threshold, the security proof provides an equation that can be used
to compute the required amount of privacy amplification (Figure 5.5).
The security has been proven strictly for certain idealized models of equip-
14This is a so-called individual attack.
15This is a so-called coherent attack.
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ment. However, most of the current discussion is whether imperfections in real
hardware (not yet accounted by the proofs) may leave loopholes, and how to
close these loopholes [5].
5.5.3 Authentication
One problem remains: how can Alice and Bob be sure they really talk to each
other on the public channel and not to Eve, when they produce secret key? Eve
could be in the middle between Alice and Bob, representing herself as Bob to
Alice and as Alice to Bob. The prevention of this is known and requires that
Alice and Bob start from an initial short common secret (a few hundred bit),
so as to be able to recognize each other during their first run of the protocol.16
After the first successful key distribution, they can use a part of the secret key
they produce to authenticate in future runs. It has been proven that quantum
key distribution provides much more secret key than it consumes in authenti-
cation.17 In this sense, quantum key distribution is a quantum secret growing
protocol.
The need for initial authentication is intrinsic and universal to all flavors
of cryptography: how else can you verify that you are talking to the intended
party and not to Eve? The initial trusted key and/or biometric authentication
(by, e.g., verifying a pen signature, talking to a known person over phone or
being physically present during the transaction) is found in some form in all
cryptographic protocols.
5.6 Technology
Essentially two technologies make quantum cryptography possible: single pho-
ton sources and single photon detectors. In addition, a transmission channel
for the single photon states, so-called quantum channel, is needed. The rest of
the system is realized using fairly standard telecommunication and electronic
hardware.
5.6.1 Single Photon Sources
Single photon sources are difficult to realize. Therefore, most systems today
rely on faint laser pulses. Conventional laser pulses, e.g., from a semiconductor
laser, are attenuated such that there is on the average less than one photon per
pulse. The problem with this approach is that there is a significant probability
that there are two or more photons per pulse, unless the average photon number
is far below one. The number of photons in the pulse follows Poisson statistics,
16Unconditionally secure authentication is employed, using hash functions of ‘almost’
universal2-class [22]. The secret key is used to pick a function from the set of hash func-
tions, then that function is applied to the message to compute a shorter authentication tag.
The message and authentication tag are sent to the other communicating party. The latter
computes an authentication tag on the received message using her copy of the secret key, and
compares it with the received tag. If the tags are the same, this guarantees that the messages
are the same with a high probability. The use of one-time pad to pick the hash function
guarantees against attacks on this authentication scheme.
17While perfect encryption, e.g., the one-time pad needs m secret bits to encrypt an m-bit
message, perfect authentication only needs in the order of log(m) secret bits to authenticate
an m-bit message.
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which for instance means that in a pulse of average photon number 0.1, there is a
0.9048 probability to find no photons, 0.0905 probability to find one photon, and
0.0047 probability to find two or more photons. If Alice emits pulses containing
more than one photon, Eve can take and store one of the photons in the pulse
until the basis is announced. Then she may perform a perfect measurement
in this basis, learning the bit value of the qubit sent to Bob. Therefore, the
presence of multiphoton pulses decreases the secret key rate. The fraction of
multiphoton pulses relative to single-photon pulses can be reduced by decreasing
the average photon number, however when the average photon number is small
it means that most bit slots are empty, also resulting in lower bit rate. In
principle, the latter could be compensated for by increasing the pulse rate.
However, another drawback remains, as the dark counts (false detection events)
in the single photon detectors are significant. The result is that the signal to
noise ratio decreases, raising the quantum bit error rate, as the average photon
number decreases.
The ideal photon source is a device that emits single photons on demand.18
Although progress is reported, practical devices are not yet available [17].
Nevertheless, practical operation over tens of kilometers has been achieved
using faint laser pulse sources. Also, there are advanced protocols19 that allow
secure operation over longer than 100 km distance with the faint laser pulse
source.
5.6.2 Single Photon Detectors
Single photon detection can be realized in a number of ways, e.g., using pho-
tomultipliers, avalanche photodiodes, as well as several types of more exotic
superconducting devices that have to be cryogenically cooled below 4 K.20 To-
day the best and in fact the only practical choice for quantum cryptography
is the avalanche photodiode [3]. An avalanche photodiode is a semiconductor
component, and to detect single photons it is operated under a large voltage.21
If a single photon is absorbed by the semiconductor, it excites a single electron.
The high electric field in the semiconductor ensures that this initial electron
collides with the lattice and excites more electrons, thus being amplified into an
avalanche of electrons (several thousands). This avalanche is large enough to be
detected as a current pulse by an external circuit. Unfortunately, an avalanche
can also occur without a photon, initiated by thermal excitation, tunneling, or
emission of trapped carriers. The latter happens when electrons from a pre-
vious avalanche get stuck in defects of the semiconductor lattice, then slowly
released. This emission of trapped carriers limits the practical count rate. This
is a serious limitation in the current systems using faint laser pulses, where a
high pulse rate is desirable in order to achieve acceptable bit rates.
5.6.3 Quantum Channel
Alice and Bob must be connected by a quantum channel. This channel must be
such that the qubit is protected from environmental noise. Standard single-mode
18 Such a source is often called a photon gun.
19For example the decoy-state protocol [9].
20For a wide review of photon detection techniques, see [7].
21The photodiode is reverse biased above its breakdown voltage.
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optical fiber used for data and telecommunication is an almost ideal channel
for single photon states (qubits). All optical fibers have transmission losses
limiting the number of qubits arriving at the detector. This has direct impact
on the key exchange rate, as the raw key rate is directly proportional to the
photon transmission probability of the link. Modern telecommunication fibers
have transmission losses of about 2 dB/km, 0.35 dB/km and 0.2 dB/km in the
commonly used communication wavelength windows of 800 nm, 1300 nm and
1550 nm respectively. At 1550 nm this means that at least 50% of the photons
are lost at 15 km, or 99% of the photons are lost at 100 km. The longest
successful quantum key distribution reported in laboratory conditions to date is
250 km, at a very slow rate of 15 secret bit/s indeed [19]. Today’s commercial
systems are limited to 50–100 km.
All fibers are subject to environmental fluctuations, such as a change in tem-
perature. This perturbs a polarization state, and therefore changes the qubit
values. Thus, the error rate is increased by the imperfect channel. The global
effect of this polarization state perturbation is a transformation between the
fiber input and fiber output. If this transformation is stable, Alice and Bob can
compensate for it by using a polarization controller to align their systems by
defining, e.g., the vertical and diagonal polarization direction. If the transforma-
tion varies slowly, one can use an active feedback system to maintain alignment
over time. Smart solutions are possible: early commercial systems used a so-
called “plug and play” optical scheme that cancelled polarization perturbation
without a need for active control [12].
As an alternative to fiber, a line-of-sight path via atmosphere can be used as
the quantum channel. Alice and Bob use small telescopes pointed at one another
to transmit photons. Availability and quality of such a link is obviously affected
by weather conditions. However, air neither perturbs polarization nor has a high
loss. The longest transmission has been achieved over 144 km between hilltops
on the Canary islands [21]; however links of 10–30 km may be more practical [10].
The success of these ground experiments suggests a possibility of distributing
a secret key between a ground station and a satellite. A low-orbit satellite can
thus provide a global key distribution network by successively establishing key
distribution links with places under its flight path.22
5.6.4 Random Number Generator
The key used for the one-time pad must be perfectly random. As computers
are deterministic systems, they can not be used to create random numbers for
cryptographic systems. Therefore, the random numbers must be created by a
truly random physical process. One example is a single photon sent through a
beamsplitter: the photon is found in one of the two exits of the beamsplitter.
Which exit it is found at, is random according to quantum mechanics. There are
certainly many other processes that can be used. While physical random number
generators with bitrates of a few Mbit/s are employed in current commercial
quantum key distribution systems, construction of high bit rate true random
number generators is still at an experimental stage.
22This requires the satellite to operate as a trusted node, as discussed later in this chapter.
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5.7 Applications
Although quantum cryptography is quite technologically mature, and commer-
cially it currently enjoys a tiny niche market, perspectives of wider adoption
are unclear. On the one hand, classical cryptographic systems based on as-
sumptions on computational complexity are very good and convenient: well-
developed, cheap, can work at high bitrates over unlimited distance. As we
have discussed in the Introduction of this chapter, their security is not guar-
anteed against future advances in cryptanalysis (and strictly speaking not even
guaranteed today), but their convenience is almost unbeatable. Should any of
them fall, this would not be the first historical example when the ease of use
was preferred over stricter security [18].
On the other hand, a quantum key distribution link is limited by distance
and bitrate, and is currently relatively expensive to set up. In fact, sending a
person (trusted courier) carrying a hard disk filled with random numbers would
provide a larger key supply than most quantum key distribution links could
deliver over their operation lifetime. Note that the quantum key distribution
link also needs a short key for the initial authentication, so the trusted courier
is involved anyway. However, the ability to grow key limitlessly from the short
authentication key makes quantum cryptography scale well in a network of many
users, while in the hard disk distribution scenario the required storage capacity
would quickly become unrealistic [11].
5.7.1 Commercial Systems with Dual Key Agreement
In today’s commercial systems, quantum key distribution is used as an extra
security layer on top of classical key distribution and encryption, see Figure 5.6.
Keys obtained from quantum key distribution are combined with keys sent using
public key cryptography, by encrypting one key using the other key as one-time
pad (exclusive-OR binary function). The resulting combined key is at least as
secure as the stronger of the two original keys. Thus, to eavesdrop the combined
key, an attacker would have to crack both public-key cryptography and quantum
key distribution. This combined key is changed several times a second, and used
in a high-throughput symmetric cipher to encrypt a wideband network link.
Although any symmetric cipher using key shorter than the encrypted mes-
sage is not unconditionally secure, this architecture is dictated by the ease of
integration into existing networks. Customers are used to having classical cryp-
tography that can encrypt the entire gigabit network link. Nevertheless, it is
argued that the security of the AES symmetric cipher improves when the key
is changed frequently and thus less ciphertext is available for cryptanalysis.
The system has an option to additionally provide one-time-pad encryption
to the users. In the commercially available units, the key generation speed and
thus one-time pad average bandwidth is no faster than a few kbit/s, however
laboratory prototypes have been demonstrated with up to 1 Mbit/s over 50 km
fiber [4].
5.7.2 Quantum Key Distribution Networks
To increase the number of users and overcome the link distance limitation, two
types of networks are possible: with trusted nodes, and with untrusted nodes.
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(a)
(b)
Symmetric cipher (AES 256 bit)
Quantum key distribution (BB84)
Public-key cryptography (RSA 2048 bit)
Combined key
Alice Bob
Combined key
Quantum key distribution
to another node 3 km away
Quantum key distribution
to another node 17 km away
Key manager
Wavelength-division multiplexers
(passive optical devices combining quantum
and classical channels into a single fiber)
link-layer, 2 Gbit/s
link-layer, 10 Gbit/s
network-layer, 0.1 Gbit/s
(virtual private network)
Classical encryptors:
Figure 5.6: Commercial quantum cryptography vintage 2010. (a) Dual key
agreement scheme. Two secret keys are distributed independently using quan-
tum cryptography and public-key cryptography, then added modulo 2 (X-ored)
together. The resulting key is used in a symmetric cipher to encrypt network
traffic. (b) Network node with quantum key distribution equipment, in a stan-
dard 19 inch wide server rack. Quantum keys are generated between this node
and two other remote nodes using ID Quantique Vectis units, then passed to clas-
sical equipment that encrypts all network traffic with those remote nodes. This
node was a part of SwissQuantum testbed network in Geneva, and operated con-
tinuously for more than a year, see http://swissquantum.idquantique.com/.
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The trusted-node network consists of point-to-point quantum key distribution
links between nodes. When two users want to establish a shared key, they find
a path through intermediate nodes, then one user sends his key to the other
user through a chain of one-time-pad encryptions using keys generated in each
point-to-point link along the path. This type of network has been demonstrated
in several metropolitan areas [8, 13].
The untrusted-node network can use optical switches at the nodes to create
an uninterrupted optical channel between end users. This is realistic with to-
day’s technology, but the optical switches do not increase transmission distance
and can thus only be used in a geographically compact network. An alternative
idea is to use so-called quantum repeaters at the untrusted nodes, which in theory
can increase the distance far beyond the 250 km limit. However, quantum re-
peaters remain a future technology. The untrusted-node network configuration
can realize the full potential of quantum cryptography, and perhaps provide a
decisive advantage over using trusted couriers and other key distribution meth-
ods. For example, each user can get and store only initial authentication keys
for every other network user, then grow more key material with any user as
needed.
5.8 Summary
The feasibility of quantum cryptography has now been demonstrated over dis-
tances up to 250 km, and in key distribution networks. Although the systems
still suffer from low key transmission rates, they do provide means for secure
communication if the public-key systems used today are not trusted. But fore-
most, today quantum cryptography is developed with an eye towards a future
in which cracking classical public-key ciphers might become practically feasible.
For example, a quantum computer might one day be able to crack today’s codes.
Quantum cryptography is also an excellent example of the intimate interplay
between fundamental and applied research.
5.9 Further Reading and Web Sites
The web site http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/ of our Quantum
Hacking group presents how industrial implementations of the quantum key dis-
tribution system can be broken. The web site http://pqcrypto.org/ investi-
gates what will happen to cryptology when the first working quantum computer
has been built.
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